A Burning Memory: The Darkest Day in the History of the Vandenberg AFB Fire Department and the Birth of the Vandenberg AFB Hot Shots

Ron Fink is Deputy Fire Chief VAFB Fire Department, (Retired)
 
 
I had the opportunity to visit crew leader, Mark Smith and the Vandenberg AFB "Hot Shot" crew the other day. The visit brought back memories of why this crew was created.

When you enter the crew quarters', there is a small pictorial shrine to the worst day in the history of the Vandenberg Fire Department. I was a VAFB fire fighter during that tragic fire over 25-years ago and this is the story of the darkest day in the history of the Vandenberg AFB fire department.

The hotshots were organized following a tragic wildfire in 1977 when four men including the Fire Chief, Assistant Fire Chief, a dozer operator and Base Commander were killed. Following a sporadic start subsequent fire chiefs and crew leaders have staffed, trained, equipped and motivated a highly competent and well-respected crew.

To understand the complexities of creating this type of fire fighting tool the reader needs to gain insight into military fire fighting strategy and planning. Most Air Force bases consist of runways, taxiways, hangars and support buildings to house troops and supplies. They are covered with carefully mowed grass and most are significantly smaller than Vandenberg.

The Fire Department

In 1977, the Vandenberg fire department consisted of 175 military and civil service fire fighters. Commanded by Chief Billy Bell, they responded to fires and other emergencies from 7 fire stations in antiquated fire engines, some dating from the 1950's and in 1,000 gallon water tankers (most with single axle drive) which were built for dust control and converted to fire support by painting them red. The base maintained mutual aid fire agreements with the Santa Barbara County fire department and several incorporated cities surrounding the base.

Staffing consisted of a fire captain, driver and two crewmembers on engines and a single driver on the tankers. Mutual aid was available, however there was no common radio frequency between the base and the outside agencies. Coordination of fire fighters, mutual aid units and bulldozers was nearly impossible.

Only two other Air Force Bases compare in size to Vandenberg. At Eglin AFB a totally separate "forestry" unit is dedicated to containing fires with tractors and plows. At Edwards AFB, the vegetation is sparse and large wild land fires are not a common concern.

Fire protection is melded into the Base Civil Engineer unit and managed by experienced military and civil service leadership. Planning, staffing, training and skills maintenance is typically focused on aircraft, conventional fuels and structure fire issues. Wild land fire fighting is addressed as a side issue and at most bases consists of minor fires in dry grass.

All of the military services (Army, Navy and Air Force) who have operated Vandenberg AFB and before it Camp Cooke and Arguello Naval Air Station had experienced several hundred grass and brush fires throughout the 60 plus year existence of military operations. Ranchers had equal experience prior to the arrival of the military.

Fire fighting methods consisted largely of using ranch equipment and hand tools prior to the arrival of the military. The Army, Navy and Air Force chose mechanized equipment and hand tools as a defensive measure.

The military command structure and base working population is largely transient in nature and no firm or consistent fire fighting strategy had been developed over the years to cope with a fire of the Honda Canyon fire.

By transient, I mean that both military commanders and fire fighting managers passed through the base at approximately two-year intervals. In the 17 years prior to this fire, this was exacerbated by commitments to both the Vietnam War and the cold war deterrent action in Europe.

Although Chief Bell and his combined military/civil service staff recognized a brush fire training need, they were unable to obtain the resources necessary to mount an effective program. "Brush fire training" consisted of a short tour of the base with an explanation that tractors were available on one hour call up (no radio communication) and that an indirect attack using established roadways was best for large fires.

A long standing base "disaster" plan consisted of mobilizing hundreds of untrained and poorly equipped military members to surround a fire and beat into submission using hand tools and fire flappers!

Neither civil service nor military fire managers had any formal wild land fire command and control or fire behavior training other than observing televised southern California fires, reading commercial publications or informal "bull sessions" to prepare them for this fire.

The Honda Canyon Fire

On December 22, 1977 the worst fire in the history of Vandenberg AFB occurred. It was named the "Honda Canyon Fire" and eventually burned some 9,000 acres, injured 65 people and took 4 lives. The lessons learned from that fire 25 years ago have not been forgotten.

Vandenberg is 150 square miles of land area divided into two distinct terrain and vegetation masses. North of the Santa Ynez River estuary is a sand dune and arroyo dominated land area covered with grasses, oaks and willows. Some of the land is covered with chaparral, however grasses dominate the ground cover of the dunes and willows reside along the creeks.

The southern part of the base is a mountainous region rising from sea level and dominated by Tranquillion Peak (1,700 feet). South Vandenberg is covered with chaparral, and pinion pines nestled on steep hillsides and in deep canyons. This is the region of the base experienced that terrible wind driven fire in December 1977.

A long drought preceded the fire and as we found out after the fire, the brush with a live to dead fuel ration was 80% dead fuel in Honda Canyon and the surrounding hills had not burned in over 50 years! Had we understood the gravity of these two factors our tactics and approach on this day would have been significantly different.

The weather on the morning of the fire was extremely unsettled. A high-pressure system existed over the four corners states and three low-pressure cells existed to the west of Vandenberg. This created a vacuum like weather system which drew warm dry air from the desert region across Vandenberg AFB at speeds reaching 50 mph at sea level and hurricane like velocities of 100 mph and greater on Tranquillion Peak.

These conditions sucked the remaining moisture out of the brush, toppled trees and power poles all over the base and kept fire crews responding all night preceding the fire to "wires arching" and automatic fire alarms caused by the wind.

Finally, a power pole and transformer was blown into a dry brushy draw on south Vandenberg near Honda Ridge Road at about 7:20 am. Workers at a communications site reported a "small brush fire" down in a canyon. The fire alarm center dispatched the first of several engines to the scene. The 1950's model fire engine and a tanker labored up the steep hill from fire station six several miles away.

When they arrived, the military fire captain reported that there was a slow moving, wind driven fire burning down hill into a steep canyon bottom. There were no roads and their hose wouldn't reach so they would attempt to use hand tools in a down hill direct attack.

Since we had no formal training to tell us that scores of fire fighters had been killed doing the exact same thing, downhill seemed like an easy solution to a tough problem. Not too much later in the day, we would learn a hard lesson in fire behavior that would leave an indelible impression on our minds to this day!

Although the engine captain was still reporting a two to three acre fire, he was also reporting that he couldn't get a line around it and the wind was blowing fiercely. Other fire alarms were still occurring on North Vandenberg, which required fire department resources.

Chief Bell recognized the shortfall of resources due to multiple calls and directed the fire alarm center to request a "full brush" response with three brush trucks and a Battalion Chief from the county with a special request for their hot shot crew. The county "hot shots" (a highly trained ground fire combat group consisting of 15 people) had been placed "out of service" for the season, however all of these young men lived in the immediate area and the county was able to recall most of them quickly.

Chief Bell and I reached the fire location about 8:15 am and he handed me a portable radio and said in his mellow tone "keep me informed Ron, tell me what the fire is doing while I go meet with the Commander". It was the last time I would see Billy Bell alive.

As I climbed out on the ridge across the canyon overlooking the fire, I was blown about by the wind and blasted by sand, twigs and small rocks. I finally worked my way to a railroad tie sized corner fence post and positioned myself so the wind pasted me to the post.

I reported that the fire had not grown significantly (I estimated 3-5 acres) and that when it reached the bottom of the draw it was going to blow out of Honda Canyon. This prophecy would become reality sooner than any of us expected.

At about 9:15 am the fire leapt out of the canyon "like a shotgun" at 60-75 mph, belching flame and black smoke and flew at hurricane force down towards the Pacific Ocean 2½ miles away. In one instant I was communicating with Chief Bell, in another he was no longer responding to radio calls.

As I made my way off of the ridge, I saw 30-40 deer pushed off of a cliff by the fire onto Honda Ridge Road! This was a very graphic illustration of the situation we were in - backed off of a cliff by a devil fire.

In less than 10 minutes, the fire grew from 3-5 acres to a monster encompassing hundreds and eventually thousands of acres. The radio was alive with reports that missile launch complexes were being directly threatened, fire fighters were being injured and positions were being abandoned as crews fled to safety.

Fire Chief Billy Bell, Assistant Fire Chief Gene Cooper, and Base Commander Col Turner were killed immediately as they tried to escape and the fire raced across their position. Dozer operator Clarence McCauley was severely burned as the fire overran his tractor. He died a few days later.

Eventually hundreds of fire fighters, scores of fire trucks from southern California and a Battalion of Navy CB's responded to help contain the fire. The wind finally subsided and a heavy rain early the next morning finally put the fire out. Four dead, 65-injured from a fire that lasted less than 24-hours!

The Aftermath

We were all deeply shocked by the gravity of the situation and were determined to make sure that it didn't happen again. The focus of the Strategic Air Commands post fire report was broader than the performance of the fire department. It examined all aspects of the fire, the base command structure, plans to address wildfires and the resources available to contend with a disaster of this magnitude. The recommendations in the report resulted in several significant changes in the way Vandenberg AFB now handles brush fires.

A task force was assembled and given the charter to come up with a viable plan to address all of the issues discussed in the SAC incident report. Fire fighting experts from Santa Barbara County, the California Office of Emergency Services, the California Department of Forestry and the US Forest Service were asked to assist the Vandenberg staff with the preparation of plans. The military is very good at preparing plans and their charter was to prepare the only brush fire management plan in the Air Force.

Training was identified as a key issue. The plan directed the fire department to create, equip and staff a seasonal "hot shot" fire crew and to obtain the best training that the California State Fire Academy had to offer for all levels of fire department management. Bulldozer operators and their supervisors were also directed to receive specialized training to handle brush fires and their equipment was upgraded to fire fighting standards.

The California Department of Forestry and the US Forest Service were added to the mutual aid agreements. The US Forest Service was funded to study the flora and fauna of Vandenberg and provide a wild land management and controlled burning plan to limit the age of plant life to 25 years or less. All of these were very bold initiatives since the Pentagon had to be convinced to fund a "one of a kind" wild fire management program.

The changes recommended by the Task Force in 1978 are still in effect today with more improvements forthcoming each year. The days of "fire flappers" have slipped into the history books. Fire Chief Billy Bell, Assistant Fire Chief Gene Cooper, dozer operator Clarence McCauley and Col Turner's legacy is a much improved fire control methodology at Vandenberg AFB.